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Abstract. We study the notion of efficiency for cooperative games on simplicial complexes. In
such games, the grand coalition [n] may be forbidden, and, thus, it is a non-trivial problem to
study the total number of payoff v∆ of a cooperative game (∆, v).
We address this question in the more general setting, by characterizing the individual values
that satisfy the general efficient requirement, that is vgen
∆
=
∑
T∈∆ aT v(T ) for a generic assignment
of real coefficients aT . The traditional and the probabilistic efficiency are treated as a special case
of this general efficiency.
Finally, we introduce a new notion of efficiency arising from the combinatorial and topological
property of the simplicial complex ∆. The efficiency in this scenario is called simplicial and we
characterize the individual values fulfilling this constraint.
In the traditional n-person game the characteristic function v : 2[n] → R determines the worth
of each coalition, where [n] def= {1, . . . , n}. The individual value φi associated to such cooperative
game (n, v) measures the contribution of the player i in the game. We collect such values all
together in the group value φ = (φ1, φ2, . . . , φn). The assessment is optimistic (w. r. to v) if the
sum of the payoff vector
∑
i φi(v) is greater than the v([n]), the worth of the grand coalition. If
the contrary happens, then φ is pessimistic (w. r. to v).
Consider the vector space of cooperative games R2
n−1, that is the set of all characteristic
function under the constrain v(∅) = 0. Provided a game (n, v) in R2n−1, we consider the scaled
game (n, c · v) given by the characteristic function (c · v)(T ) = cv(T ) where c is a real constant. It
seems natural to assume that in this case the individual value is also scaled by c, φi(c ·v) = cφi(v).
Therefore consider a cone of games I in R2
n−1.
We are interesting in group values that are nor optimistic or pessimistic, despite this might
be an artificial condition. This consideration leads to the constraint known as called Efficiency
Axiom:
Efficiency Axiom.
For every cooperative game (2[n], v) in I, one has
∑n
i=1 φi(v) = v([n]).
If certain coalitions are forbidden (take for instance the grand coalition), it is necessary to
study what could take the place of the the total number of payoff v∆, that in the traditional
case reduces to v∆ = v([n]). In this work we focus on the specific instance of this problem for
cooperative game on a simplicial complex [Mar20a, Mar20b]. We are going to shortly present
our new results after introducing this new generalization for cooperative games.
Cooperative game on simplicial complex. Inspired by several articles [BDJLL01, BDJLL02,
MTMZ19, MZ11, FV11, NZKI97, Zha99], the author has defined cooperative games on simpli-
cial complexes [Mar20a]. In fact, a simplicial complex is a family ∆ of subsets of [n] under the
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constrain that every subset of X ∈ ∆, also belongs to the family ∆. A cooperative game on ∆ is
defined by a characteristic function v:
v : ∆→ R
with v(∅) = 0. In such game, a player i in [n] may join a coalition T only if T ∪ i ∈ ∆. In such
case, the coalition is feasible. If every subset of [n] is feasible, then ∆ = 2[n] and we recover the
literature case.
As in the classical case, the individual value function φi(v) for the player i determines the worth
of the participation of i in a feasible coalition during the cooperative game (∆, v). As before, we
may consider a cone I of cooperative games defined in R∆, the vector space of all cooperative
games on ∆.
Quasi-probabilistic values. The issue of studying v∆ already arises in the work of Bilbao,
Driessen, Jime´nez Losada and Lebro´n [BDJLL01], where they introduce the notion of prob-
abilistic efficiency for games over a matroid. One of the perks of matroids is that they are pure
simplicial complex; in other words the maximal facets of a matroid have the same cardinality,
see for instance [Sta12, Sta96, Sta91, Sta84, Oxl11, Mar18, BM19]. Here we present the natural
generalization to simplicial complexes that already appears in Section 6 of [Mar20a]:
Probabilistic Efficiency Axiom.
For every cooperative game (∆, v) in I,
∑n
i=1 φi(v) =
∑
F∈Fs ∆ cFv(F),
with
∑
F∈Fs ∆ cF = 1 and cF ≥ 0 for every facet F of ∆.
In the above equation, Fs ∆ is the set of facets of ∆, that are maximal elements by inclusion.
It is worth to recall that the Efficient axiom, and respectively the Probabilistic efficient are
crucial to characterizes the Shapley values [Sha53, Sha72, Web88], and respectively the quasi-
probabilistic values that can be written as sum of Shapley values [BDJLL01, Mar20a].
Our Approach. We adopt a differ point of view originated by the next consideration. The
first axiom in the theory of probabilistic values is the Linearity Axiom for individual values, see
Section 3 of [Web88]. We are also going to assume that the total number of payoff v∆ is a linear
function:
v∆ : R∆ → R.
Therefore, the total number of payoff can be written as
v∆ =
∑
T∈∆
aT v(T ).
(Note that we allow T = ∅, because v(∅) = 0.) The choice of the coefficients aT describes
a diverse efficiency scenario: for instance, the efficiency axiom for (2[n], v) is given by setting
aT = 0 for every T , [n] and a[n] = 1. Similarly, the probabilistic efficiency of Bilbao, Driessen,
Jime´nez Losada and Lebro´n [BDJLL01] is obtained from the choice of aF = cF for every facet
F of ∆ and aT = 0, otherwise. Furthermore, a more flexible efficiency condition is needed in
Theorem E of [Mar20b] to properly encode Shapley values on simplicial complexes.
Our first result characterize individual values that satisfies the general efficient condition.
Theorem 2.1. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex and let I be a cone of cooperative games v defined
on ∆ containing the carrier games C and Cˆ.
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Let φ be a group value on I such that for each i ∈ [n] and assume that for each v ∈ I, we can
write:
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
The group value φ satisfies the simplicial efficiency axiom if and only if for all non-facet T in ∆∑
i∈T
piT\i −
∑
j,T∈Link∆ j
p jT = aT ,
and for every facet F of ∆ ∑
i∈F
piF\i = aF .
In Theorem 2.3, we specialize the previous result in the traditional setting and we reproduce
Theorem 11 of [Web88]
Similarly, applying Theorem 2.1, we characterize the individual values that satisfy the proba-
bilistic efficiency, see Theorem 2.5.
Moreover in Section 3, we introduce and study a new efficiency conditions: the simplicial
efficiency.
The simplicial efficiency. In this scenario is built on the following point of view. If the grand
coalition [n] is forbidden, the largest possible coalitions are precisely the elements of Fs ∆. How-
ever, the facets may intersect. Thus, in Section 3, with an inclusion-exclusion argument we study
the following number of total payoff:
vsimpl
∆
=
k∑
l=1
∑
{Fi j }∈(Fs ∆l )
(−1)l+1v(Fi1 ∩ · · · ∩ Fil).
We classify the values fulfilling this requirement in Theorem 3.5. In the specific case of matroids,
we show that vsimpl
∆
only depends by the dimension-zero and codimension-one skeleton of ∆, see
Theorem 3.8. Moreover in Remarks 3.3 and 3.4 we argue that the probabilistic efficiency is a
first-hand approximation of the simplicial efficiency.
Acknowledgments. The author is currently supported by the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foun-
dation and by the Royal Swedish Academy of Science.
1. Preliminaries
In this manuscript n is a positive integer and we denote by [n] def= {1, . . . , n}. A (finite) simpli-
cial complex ∆ over n verticies is a family of subsets of [n] with the simplicial condition:
T ∈ ∆, S ⊆ T ⇒ S ∈ ∆.
The set of elements of the simplicial complex is denoted by Set(∆). A facet of ∆ is a set F in ∆
that is maximal by inclusion. The set of facets is Fs ∆. If every facets have the same cardinality
then the simplicial complex is said to be pure.
In this paper, we refer to results of [Mar20a] and [Mar20b] that use the notions of star and
link of a vertex i in ∆. We recall those for completeness, even if they will not be central in our
study.
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If S is an element in ∆, then S¯ def= 2S is the (|S | − 1)-dimensional simplex defined on the
verticies of S .
Definition 1.1. The star of an element S in ∆ is the simplicial complex defined to be the collec-
tion of all subset in T¯ with T being in ∆ ans containing S ,
Star∆ S = {A : A ∈ T¯ , T ∈ ∆, S ⊆ T }.
We highlight when S = {i} is a vertex, then Star∆ i is the set of simplex T¯ containing i, that is
Star∆ i = {A : A ⊆ T, i ∈ T ∈ ∆}.
Definition 1.2. The link of of an element S in a simplicial complex ∆ is made by the subsets A
of T ∈ ∆, such that T is disjoint by S and can be completed by S , S ∪ T , to an element in ∆:
Link∆ S = {A : A ∈ T¯ with T ∈ ∆ such that S ∩ T = ∅, S ∪ T ∈ ∆}.
The case when S is the singleton {i} will be extremely relevant in our work: Link∆ i is the set of
simplex T in ∆ with i < T such that T ∪ i ∈ ∆:
Link∆ i = {T ∈ ∆ : i < T and T ∪ i ∈ ∆}.
1.3. Matroids. Since they were introduced by Whitney [Whi35] in 1935, matroids are at the
crossroads of Algebra, Combinatorics, Geometry, and Topology. New variations have appeared
in literature encoding different type of independence [Moc12, Mar18, BM19], but here we recall
the traditional one and we refer for a detailed description to [Sta12, Sta96, Sta91, Sta84, Oxl11].
A matroid on the ground set [n] is a collection I of subsets of [n] (called independent sets),
such that (I1) ∅ ∈ I, (I2) A ⊆ B ∈ I ⇒ A ∈ I, and (I3) A, B ∈ I, |A| < |B| ⇒ ∃b ∈ B \ A :
A ∪ {b} ∈ I.
The first two axioms make I into a (non-empty) simplicial complex. Axiom (I3) is sometimes
referred as independent set exchange property (or independence augmentation axiom.). Let I
be a matroid on the ground set [n], and let A ⊆ [n]. All maximal independent subsets of A
have the same cardinality, called the rank rk(A) of A, whereas the corank of A is cork(A) =
rk([n]) − rk(A). Hence a matroid is a pure simplicial complex, see for instance Figure 1a. Not
every pure simplicial complex is a matroid; in fact Figure 1b shows a rank three simplicial
complex that is not a matroid. Indeed, the independent set {5}, cannot be extended to a base
by any element in the independent set {2, 3}. Simplicial complexes that are not matroids are
extremely important in Mathematics; few example can be found in [Mar15, GM16, GM18].
1.4. Cooperative games on simplicial complexes. In [Mar20a], the author introduces the no-
tion of cooperative game on the simplicial complex ∆, inspired by the work of Bilbao, Driessen,
Jime´nez Losada and Lebro´n [BDJLL01].
Here we shortly recall that a cooperative game on a simplicial complex ∆ is the pair (∆, v)
where v is a characteristic function v : Set(∆) → R under the constrain v(∅) = 0. The verticies
of ∆ are the players of the cooperative game and a coalition T is feasible if T ∈ ∆. The set R∆ of
characteristic functions on ∆ is naturally a real vector space.
Given a cooperative game (∆, v), one can re-scale the characteristic function with a scalar c
and obtain a new cooperative game (∆, cv), where (cv)(T ) = c(v(T )) for every subset T ∈ ∆.
Definition 1.5. An individual value for a player i in [n] is a function φi : R∆ → R.
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(a) This simplicial complex is a ma-
troid.
1
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3
4
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(b) This simplicial complex is not a
matroid.
Figure 1. Two examples of pure simplicial complexes.
The goal of each individual value φi(v) is assessing the worth of the participation of the player
i in to the game. Naturally, we are looking for values such that φi(cv) = cφi(v), because the worth
of each player is just re-scaled. For this reason we often consider a cone I of cooperative game
in R∆.
1.6. Efficiency axioms previously introduced in literature. In the traditional case the sum of
such values is often compare with the total number of payoff v([n]) of the grand coalition [n]. If
the sum
∑
i φi(v) is greater than v([n]), then the assessment is going to distribute to all the player
a larger amount than the one eventually obtained. This is the optimistic (w. r. to v) setting. Vice
versa, the group value φ(v) = {φ1(v), . . . , φn(v)} is pessimistic.
It may be artificial, but it is surely interesting to consider group values that are not optimistic
or pessimistic. This leads to the so called Efficiency Axiom:
Efficiency Axiom.
For every cooperative game (2[n], v) in I,
∑n
i=1 φi(v) = v([n]).
This axiom is part of the requirement in the characterization of the Shapley values [Sha53,
Sha72, Web88].
The effort of generalizing such requirement can be found already in the work [BDJLL01],
where they deal with the notion of probabilistic efficiency for a cooperative game over a matroid.
Here we present the natural generalization to simplicial complexes:
Probabilistic Efficiency Axiom.
For every cooperative game (∆, v) in I,
∑n
i=1 φi(v) =
∑
F∈Fs ∆ cFv(F),
with
∑
F∈Fs ∆ cF = 1 and cF ≥ 0 for every facet F.
As the the previous case, also this axiom is used as a necessary and sufficient condition for
writing the quasi-probabilistic values as sum of Shapley values [BDJLL01, Mar20a].
1.7. Carrier games. There are two set of games that have a crucial role in the theory of proba-
bilistic values [Web88]. We are going to called both set carrier games, even if in literature this
terminology often refer to the first one:
C = {vT : ∅ , T ⊂ [n]}, Cˆ = {vˆT : ∅ , T ⊂ [n]},
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where vT and vˆT are so defined:
vT (S ) =
1 T ⊆ S0 otherwise. , vˆT (S ) =
1 T ( S0 otherwise.
We generalize these notation for any element T of a simplicial complex. Indeed for every par-
tially order set (P,≤P) and every element q in P we consider the following function:
uPq (s)
def
=
1 q ≤P s0 otherwise. , uˆPq (s) def=
1 q <P s0 otherwise.
Thus, we define
vT (S )
def
= u∆T (S ), vˆT (S )
def
= uˆ∆T (S ).
It is easy to see that in the classical case (when ∆ is a full simplex on n verticies) these functions
reproduce the carrier games.
Definition 1.8. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex. The sets of carrier games are so defined:
C = {vT : ∅ , T ∈ ∆}, Cˆ = {vˆT : ∅ , T ∈ ∆},
where vT (S )
def
= u∆T (S ) and vˆT (S )
def
= uˆ∆T (S ); moreover, vˆ∅
def
= uˆ∆∅ .
2. A unique approach to efficiency
Let us assume that the total number of payoff is prescribed as
(1) vgen
∆
=
∑
T∈∆
aT v(T ).
and we require the following efficiency constrain:
Generic Efficiency Axiom.
For every cooperative game (2[n], v) in I,
∑n
i=1 φi(v) = v
gen
∆
.
Then, we characterize the individual values that can be written in the classical sum of marginal
contributions and that satisfy the Generic Efficiency Axiom.
Theorem 2.1. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex and let I be a cone of cooperative games v defined
on ∆ containing the carrier games C and Cˆ.
Let φ be a group value on I such that for each i ∈ [n] and assume that for each v ∈ I, we can
write:
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
The group value φ satisfies the simplicial efficiency axiom if and only if for all non-facet T in
∆
(2)
∑
i∈T
piT\i −
∑
j,T∈Link∆ j
p jT = aT ,
and for all facet F of ∆
(3)
∑
i∈F
piF\i = aF .
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Proof. Let us show that the equations (2) and (3) are necessary. Using our assumption, this is:
n∑
i=1
φi(v) =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
We reorder the terms in the sum as
n∑
i=1
φi(v) =
∑
T∈∆
v(T )
∑
i∈T
piT\i −
∑
j,T∈Link∆ j
p jT
 .
Since vgen
∆
=
∑
T∈∆ aT v(T ), when T = F is a facet, we get (3). If T is not a facet, then it is clear
that φ satisfies (2).
To prove the opposite direction one needs to note that if T is not a facet, then
n∑
i=1
φ(vT ) −
n∑
i=1
φ(vˆT ) =
∑
i∈T
piT\i −
∑
j,T∈Link∆ j
p jT .
By hypothesis the latter equals aT . Similarly if F is a facet then
n∑
i=1
φ(vF) =
∑
i∈T
piT\i.
and by hypothesis the latter is equal aF . 
2.2. The Traditional Efficiency. As a corollary of the previous theorem we can easily obtain
Theorem 11 of [Web88]. In fact, in the traditional cooperative game on a full simplicial complex
with n verticies, the efficiency axiom is the following:
Efficiency Axiom.
For every cooperative game (2[n], v) in I, one has
∑n
i=1 φi(v) = v([n]).
Thus, in equation (1), aT = 0 for every subset of [n], but a[n] = 1. Hence, Theorem 11 of
[Web88] follows as a corollary of our result:
Theorem 2.3. Let I ⊂ R2n−1 be the cone of cooperative games containing the (classical) carrier
games C and Cˆ.
Let φ be a group value on I such that for each i ∈ [n] and assume that for each v ∈ I, we can
write:
φi(v) =
∑
T∈[n]\i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
The group value φ satisfies the simplicial efficiency axiom if and only if for all non-facet T in ∆∑
i∈T
piT\i −
∑
j<T
p jT = 0,
and for all facet F of ∆ ∑
i∈[n]
pi[n]\i = 1.
Proof. Observe that Link2[n] i = [n] \ i and there is only one facet, F = [n]. Then, apply Theorem
2.1 with v∆ = v([n]). 
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2.4. The Probabilistic Efficiency. We can also characterize the individual values that satisfy
the probabilistic efficiency, introduced in [BDJLL01] for cooperative games on matroids and
generalized for games on every simplicial complex in in Section 6 of [Mar20a]:
Probabilistic Efficiency Axiom.
For every cooperative game (∆, v) in I,
∑n
i=1 φi(v) =
∑
F∈Fs ∆ cFv(F),
with
∑
F∈Fs ∆ cF = 1 and cF ≥ 0 for every facet F.
Thus, the total number of payoff can be written as in equation (1) by setting aT = 0 for every
subset of [n], but the facets where aF = cF . In next results we characterize the individual values
that fulfill this efficiency request.
Theorem 2.5. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex and let I be a cone of cooperative game defined
on ∆ containing the carrier games C and Cˆ.
Let φ be a group value on I such that for each i ∈ [n] and each v ∈ I, we can write:
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
The group value φ satisfies the probabilistic efficiency axiom if and only if for all non-facet T
in ∆
(4)
∑
i∈T
piT\i −
∑
j,T∈Link∆ j
p jT = 0,
and for all facet F of ∆
(5)
∑
i∈F
piF\i = cF
Proof. Simply apply Theorem 2.1 with v∆ =
∑
F∈Fs ∆ cFv(F). 
Remark 2.6. We note that the conditions
∑
F∈Fs ∆ cF = 1 and cF ≥ 0 are irrelevant in the
Theorem 2.5. Thus the statement holds also for the individual values that satisfy the condition∑n
i=1 φi(v) =
∑
F∈Fs ∆ cFv(F) without any requirement on cF . For instance, cF may be a negative
number.
3. The Simplicial Efficiency
In this section we want to introduce a new concept of efficiency that differs from the previous
approaches. Since the grand coalition [n] is forbidden, the largest possible coalitions are pre-
cisely the elements of Fs ∆, but the facets may intersect. If we work under the constrain that ∆ is
a connected simplicial complex, if ∆ , 2[n], then every facet intersect at least another facet. This
reasoning leads to the inclusion exclusion problem for computing the total number of payoff v∆
for the cooperative game (∆, v). Let us set up a proper arithmetic for doing this.
Let F1, F2, ..., Fk be a random order of the facets. We begin by considering v(F1) + v(F2).
If they intersect, then the worth of intersection is double counted and we subtract this: v(F1) +
v(F2) − v(F1 ∩ F2). Next, we add v(F3) and we might need to correct again our computation
subtracting v(F3 ∩ (F1 ∪ F2)). Now, v(F3 ∩ (F1 ∪ F2)) may not be a simplex, but it is the union
of simplicies. Therefore, we use the following trick: let K be a sub-complex of ∆, then
(6) v(K) def=
∑
F∈Fs K
v(F).
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With this in mind, we keep going in our computation by rewriting v(F3 ∩ (F1 ∪ F2)) and adding
v(F4) and so on. Thus, we define v
simpl
∆
as the following real number:
(7) vsimpl
∆
def
= v(F1) + v(F2) − v(F1 ∩ F2) + v(F3) − v(F3 ∩ (F1 ∪ F2)) + . . .
Let us now prove that such number is well define, by showing that is is independent by the
ordering of the facets.
Remark 3.1. The arithmetic trick we are using is not so far from the idea proposed in [BDJLL01].
Indeed their efficiency axiom can be seen as the probabilistic (weighted) version of
∑n
i=1 φi(v) =
v(∆)
by (6)
=
∑
F∈Fs ∆ v(F).
We recall that if A is a finite set,
(
A
l
)
is the set of subsets of A of cardinality l.
Theorem 3.2. Let k be the number of facets of a simplicial complex ∆, k def= # Fs ∆. The total
number of payoff v∆ for the cooperative game (∆, v) defined in equation (7) is precisely
(8) v∆ =
k∑
l=1
∑
{Fi j }∈(Fs ∆l )
(−1)l+1v(Fi1 ∩ · · · ∩ Fil)
where Fi j is the i j-th elements of the set {Fi1 , . . . , Fil}.
Moreover, if ∆ is the full simplex 2[n], then v∆ = v([n]).
Proof. Let us consider the sum of the characteristic function evaluated over all facets
∑
F∈Fs ∆ v(F).
Of course, we are double counting (at least!) everything that is in the intersection of two facets,
and to correct our computation we take away this quantity, leading to:∑
F∈Fs ∆
v(F) −
∑
{Fi1 ,Fi2 }⊆Fs ∆
v(Fi1 ∩ Fi2).
If a certain set T appears in more than in one intersection Fi1 ∩ Fi2 , we are subtracting v(T ) too
many times. So we should again correct our partial step by adding triple intersections:∑
F∈Fs ∆
v(F) −
∑
{Fi1 ,Fi2 }⊆Fs ∆
v(Fi1 ∩ Fi2) +
∑
{Fi1 ,Fi2 ,Fi3 }⊆Fs ∆
v(Fi1 ∩ Fi2 ∩ Fi3).
Because we only consider finite simplicial complex (see Section 1), by iteration we get the
formula in the statement.
Finally, in the case ∆ is the full simplex, there is only one facet, [n], and so there are no double
nor triple intersections. Naturally, the entire argument reduces to v∆ =
∑
F∈{[n]} v(F) = v([n]). 
Another point of view for the previous proof is provide by considering the following sub-
complexes of ∆:
∆(0) = ∆
∆(1)
not
= ∆′ def=
⋃
{Fi1 ,Fi2 }⊆Fs ∆
Fi1 ∩ Fi2
and generically
(9) ∆( j) =
⋃
{Fi1 ,Fi2 ,...,Fi j }⊆Fs ∆
Fi1 ∩ Fi2 ∩ · · · ∩ Fi j
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With this notation and using the arithmetic trick in equation (6), v∆ is the sum with signs of the
worth each of these ∆( j):
(10) v∆ = v(∆(0)) − v(∆(1)) + v(∆(2)) + · · · + (−1) jv(∆( j)) + . . . v(∆(# Fs ∆))
where some of the ∆( j) can be empty.
Remark 3.3. If we want to take in consideration a probabilistic approach, we could provide a
probability distribution for the facets of ∆(0) as done in Section 4 of [BDJLL01] and generalized
in [Mar20a]. Then one could do the same for ∆(1) and generically ∆( j) and obtain a probabilistic
version of (10) and so a probabilistic version of the simplicial efficiency axiom. A coherent
choice for such probabilities should be requested.
Remark 3.4. Another way of looking the probabilistic efficiency proposed in [BDJLL01] in
view of our results is the following. Equation (10) shows how v(∆) (that essentially is the condi-
tion requested in [BDJLL01] seems a first approximation of the Combinatorics of the problem.
Nevertheless, in the matroidal case, such approximation is not so far from the Simplicial effi-
ciency axiom. We are going to treat this in the Section 3.6.
The following functions encode the coefficients of v(T ) in formula (8). For every T ∈ ∆, we
denote by dT the following number:
dT
def
=
 ∑
k,T=F1∩···∩Fk
(−1)k+1

where the sum runs over all positive number k such that T can be written as a k-intersection of
facets of ∆. It is useful to consider dT = 0, if T cannot be written as intersection of facets.
Theorem 3.5. Let ∆ be a simplicial complex and let I be a cone of cooperative games defined
on ∆ containing the carrier games C and Cˆ.
Let φ be a group value on I such that for each i ∈ [n] and each v ∈ I, we can write:
φi(v) =
∑
T∈Link∆ i
piT (v(T ∪ i) − v(T )) .
The group value φ satisfies the simplicial efficiency axiom if and only if for all non-facet T in ∆
(11)
∑
i∈T
piT\i −
∑
j,T∈Link∆ j
p jT = dT ,
and for all facet F of ∆
(12)
∑
i∈F
piF\i = 1.
Proof. Apply Theorem 2.1 with aT = dT 
3.6. The matroid case. In the case the simplicial complex is a matroid ∆ = M as treated in
[BDJLL02, BDJLL01, MTMZ19, MZ11, FV11], then all the facets (bases) {Bi1 , . . . , Bik } have
the same cardinality, say r.
Therefore by using (6), we prove that the total number of payoff is completely determined as
in equation (10) by the ∆(0) and ∆(1), that is, by the payoff of the facets and of the intersections
of cardinality r − 1. (We have simplified out notation by denoting ∆(1) as ∆′.)
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First let us rewrite (7) and set up some notations. Consider a random order of the bases
B1, B2, ..., Bk. The notation B0
def
= ∅ is useful. Let us denote
B˜ j
def
= B0 ∪ B1 ∪ · · · ∪ B j.
This is the sequential partial union of the facets under the given order. For instance, B˜0 = ∅,
B˜1 = B1, B˜2 = B1 ∪ B2 and B˜k = ∆.
Matroids are simplicial complex with a special property: indeed they are shellable [Bjo¨80,
BW96, BW97, ACS16, AB17, SW17] and, therefore, there exists a shelling order of the facets
(bases) B1, B2, ..., Bk such that B˜ j−1∩B j has codimension 1, that is B˜ j−1∩B j has dimension r−2
(the intersection is made by cardinality r − 1 faces).
Remark 3.7. The dimension of a simplicial complex differ by one with respect its rank. For
instance, every non-empty graphs have rank 2, because every edge is identified by two verticies,
and graphs are one dimensional.
Theorem 3.8. Let (M, v) be a cooperative game on a matroid M of rank r. Then, there exists
an ordering of the facets (the shelling order of the bases) such that the total number of payoff is
provided as
v∆ = v(∆) − v(∆′)
where
∆′ =
⋃
{Fi1 ,Fi2 }⊆Fs ∆
Fi1 ∩ Fi2 .
In other words,
vM =
q∑
B∈Fs ∆
v(B) −
∑
L
v(L),
where the second sum runs over the subcomplex L of ∆ of dimension r− 2 that are written as the
intersection F˜ j−1 ∩ F j for j = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. This is proved using shellability together with Theorem 3.2 and equation (10). 
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